A vulnerability in the Windows Remote Procedure Call (RPC) mechanism allows attackers to elevate their privileges to System, Kaspersky reports.
The local privilege escalation issue potentially affects all Windows versions and abuses another legitimate Windows mechanism, where processes are allowed to impersonate other processes to perform specific actions.
The root cause of the security defect, which Kaspersky researcher Haidar Kabibo named PhantomRPC, is an architectural weakness, potentially turning any process that depends on RPC into a possible escalation path.
In Windows, RPC is the mechanism that allows processes to communicate with one another and invoke functions that are implemented in other processes, regardless of their execution contexts. It uses a client–server model, where the invoking process is the client.
Windows also allows services to impersonate users or other services to temporarily operate in their security context, and controls this functionality through impersonation levels ranging from Anonymous to Impersonate and Delegate.
To impersonate a client, the service needs a specific privilege that is granted by default to certain services, such as those running under the Local Service and Network Service accounts.
Furthermore, the RPC runtime does not verify the legitimacy of RPC servers, and processes are allowed to deploy RPC servers exposing the same endpoints as legitimate services.
To exploit PhantomRPC, Kabibo says, an attacker needs to compromise a privileged service, deploy a fake RPC server, listen to specific requests, and then impersonate the targeted service to escalate their privileges.
Network Service account service abuse
The attacker could compromise a service running under the Network Service account and deploy a fake RPC server with the RPC interface UUID and exposed endpoint name as TermService, the default Remote Desktop service.
The attacker could then force a policy update to cause the Group Policy service, which runs with System privileges, to perform an RPC call to TermService. Because TermService is disabled by default, the request would fail.
However, the attacker’s RPC server, which also receives the RPC request, can now impersonate the security context of the Group Policy service and elevate privileges to System.
After identifying other RPC clients attempting to communicate with unavailable servers, Kabibo discovered four other PhantomRPC exploitation paths, noting that the weakness leads to a large attack surface, because numerous system DLLs in Windows rely on RPC.
“Applications that invoke seemingly benign APIs may unintentionally trigger privileged RPC interactions. Under certain conditions, these interactions could be abused to achieve local privilege escalation without the user’s knowledge,” the researcher says.
In another scenario, the attacker’s fake RPC server would wait for a high-privileged user to launch Microsoft Edge, which makes an RPC call to the TermService upon start. The attacker’s server intercepts the request and elevates its privileges from Network Service to System.
Another attack path listens to the background RPC calls that the Diagnostic System Host Service (WDI) periodically makes to TermService using a high impersonation level. Using the same setup, the attacker elevates privileges without user interaction, as the WDI automatically makes the calls every 5 to 15 minutes.
Local Service account service abuse
The security researcher also discovered two attack paths that abuse a Local Service account to escalate privileges, such as the DHCP Client service, which is enabled by default and exposes an RPC server with multiple interfaces and endpoints.
The attacker’s fake RPC server mimics the legitimate RPC service exposed by the DHCP Client and listens for the RPC calls that ipconfig makes to it when run by an administrator. The scenario assumes that the DHCP Client service is disabled, allowing the fake server to impersonate the client.
The Windows Time service, also enabled by default under the Local Service account, exposes an RPC server with two endpoints, and the executable w32tm.exe interacts with it using RPC.
Because w32tm.exe calls a nonexistent named pipe not exposed by the legitimate service, the attacker can deploy an RPC server that exposes it, then wait for a high-privileged user to run the executable so that the RPC request is redirected to the malicious server.
“In this scenario, it is important to note that the legitimate Windows Time service does not need to be disabled. Because the executable attempts to connect to a nonexistent endpoint, it is sufficient for the attacker to expose that endpoint through the malicious RPC server,” the researcher says.
Kaspersky reported the issue in September 2025. Microsoft classified it as moderate-severity due to the required impersonation privilege and said it does not require immediate remediation.
Responding to a SecurityWeek inquiry, a Microsoft spokesperson said:
“We appreciate the work of Kaspersky in identifying and responsibly reporting this issue through a coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This technique requires an already-compromised machine and does not grant unauthenticated or remote access. Any update is a balance between existing compatibility and customer risk, and we remain committed to continually hardening our products. We recommend customers follow security best practices, including limiting administrative privileges and applying the principle of least privilege.”
*Updated with statement from Microsoft.
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