The Android sandbox environment previously known as Android for Work is susceptible to "app-in-the-middle attacks" that put enterprise data at risk, Skycure security researchers say.
The secure framework, currently referred to as “work features in Android,” is meant to address the BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) approach that brings millions of personal devices into business environments. Introduced in Android 5.0 Lollipop, the feature aims to separate business and personal data on the same device through the use of a second, business profile managed by IT administrators.
Having all of the business applications, email and documents managed and secured within the business profile but leaving the personal profile unrestricted would provide users a sense of increased privacy, because admins would not be able to manage or monitor their personal apps. The feature leverages the mechanism of user separation.
According to Skycure, while Android for Work was designed as an additional sandbox to prevent apps from outside the container from accessing data inside it, two ‘app-in-the-middle’ attacks allow malicious apps in the personal profile to break this wall. Thus, Android for Work is only a seemingly secure framework, and sensitive enterprise information can be accessed and stolen from the personal profile, they say.
The two attacks, however, prey on the weakest link in the security chain, namely the human factor. User interaction is required for both attacks to be successful, the researchers have discovered.
The first such attack, the security firm explains, relies on a malicious application in the personal profile acquiring permissions to view and take action on all notifications, including those from the sandboxed environment. Because Notifications access is a device-level permission, a malicious app would immediately have access to sensitive information such as calendar meetings, email messages and other information in these notifications.
“This capability circumvents the secure separation logic between personal and work profiles, which is offered by Android for Work. An app-in-the-middle attack may manipulate a user to enable the Notification Access permission (even for a legitimate function in the personal persona) in order to gain access to information in the work profile. If the malicious app is designed to transmit the information viewed in notifications to a command and control server, then the information contained in notifications is no longer secure,” Yair Amit, CTO & Co-Founder at Skycure, explains in a blog post.
The security company notes that an attacker could initiate a “forgot password” process on some enterprise systems and hijack the subsequent on-device notification, thus receiving full enterprise access, without being necessarily restrained to the mobile device. By immediately dismissing the notification and archiving the recovering email through the Android Notifications API, the malicious app could prevent the user from noticing the attack.
“This presents a serious threat to the use of Android for Work as a secure sandbox for mobile work productivity, as EMM [Enterprise Mobility Management] solutions have no mechanism to recognize or defend against it. The attacker may even capture 2-factor authentication and administrators will not have any visibility of the theft,” Amit says. The company also published a video to demonstrate this attack.
The second app-in-the-middle attack leverages Android’s Accessibility Service, which was designed to offer user interface enhancements when users interact with their device. Because this service has access to “virtually all content and controls, both reading and writing, on the device,” an application in the personal profile with Accessibility permissions could access applications executed in the sandbox, researchers say.
As detailed in this video demonstration, because the attack resides in the personal profile, which isn’t monitored or controlled from the work profile, IT administrators can’t detect the exposure of sensitive information if the malicious application uses the Accessibility Service, researchers say. However, for such an attack to be possible, an application would have to register as an Accessibility Service and manipulate the user to grant the access.
According to the security company, Android engineers have implemented an API for the whitelisting of Accessibility Services, which EMM vendors can implement in their Android for Work administration interfaces. This API, the company notes, can be circumvented either by a malicious app that has the same package name as a whitelisted legitimate app, or by an existing malicious app-in-the-middle Accessibility service that tricks the user into whitelisting it (because non-system Accessibility services already enabled on the device have to be whitelisted).
“The interesting thing about both of these app-in-the-middle methods of defeating the Android for Work profile separation is that the device and the Android operating system remain operating exactly as designed and intended. It is the user that must be tricked into placing the software on the device and activating the appropriate services that allow the malware access to sensitive information,” the security firm says.
Skycure notes that the Android team has been contacted on this matter but that their investigation determined that the aforementioned application behavior is intended, and not considered a security vulnerability. However, they agreed that the findings should be made public, “to raise awareness to the exposure.” The danger related to these issues, the company says, is the illusion of security that the sandbox offers.
“The attack flows that we uncovered exploit valuable capabilities of Android in a way that transforms these features into a major security risk to organizations that utilize Android for Work and expect it to stay secure. This is a user-experience vs. security tradeoff dilemma. We appreciate Google's commitment to security, but strongly believe that more work needs to be done in order to better protect organizations against App-in-the-Middle attacks,” Amit told SecurityWeek in an email.